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A B S T R A C T
Food security and agricultural-led industrialisation are pivotal development objectives in Ethiopia. One of the
main challenges this country faces is increasing agricultural productivity by integrating smallholder farmers into
a high-value agricultural commodity supply chain. This paper examines an integrated project—the Agricultural
Value Chains Project in Oromia (AVCPO)—that aims to improve the livelihoods of smallholders in the Bale Zone
by involving them in the production of high-quality durum wheat and linking them to the pasta industry via
farmers’ cooperatives. Using primary data collected in 2014 and retrospective information, this paper in-
vestigates the AVCPO’s effects on the quantity of cereal production, the share of cereals that have been sold
through cooperatives, food security, and education. In order to account for potential violations of the exclusion
restriction assumption, an instrumental variable approach is applied, together with three additional estimation
strategies.
The results suggest that the project has had a large and positive effect on gross and net values of cereal
production per hectare, as well as on the share of production sold to pasta makers through cooperatives. These
benefits accrue equally to land-rich and land-poor farmers. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that the AVCPO
has improved educational outcomes and reduced food insecurity, without affecting crop rotation practices.
Overall, our findings point to the effectiveness of the project. Before replicating or scaling up this intervention,
however, it is necessary to understand how to better involve poorer farmers and which adjustments are needed if
the areas selected have a lower potential than Bale Zone.
1. Introduction
Ethiopia is the leading producer of wheat in Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA) (FAOSTAT, 2015) as well as the only country where smallholders
have a majority share in its production (Spielman et al., 2010; Shiferaw
et al., 2014). As in many other SSA countries, a growing population,
urbanisation and rising incomes are driving a continuous increase in
food demand, especially of processed and convenience-oriented foods
such as pasta (Jayne et al., 2013; Mason et al., 2015; Donley, 2016).
Wheat consumption in Ethiopia has risen faster than any other major
food grain, especially for pasta and bread consumption, and is expected
to continue to rise rapidly in the future (Minot et al., 2015). While the
rising demand for pasta in Ethiopia is largely satisfied by the domestic
pasta industry (Shiferaw et al., 2014; Chiari, 2015), the growing de-
mand for durum wheat that results is largely met through imports.
Ethiopia's increasing reliance on food imports from volatile global
markets has raised concerns over national food security, as has the
possibility that imports may negatively affect the livelihoods of small-
scale farmers (Gebreselassie et al., 2017).
It is not an easy task to generate systematic linkages between and
among smallholder cooperatives, pasta manufacturers and consumers
in a relatively nascent value chain (VC). Efforts to address this situation
require attention to wheat production quality, input and output market
failures and coordination problems facing smallholder farmers and
other actors in the value chain. This implies, in particular, identifying
institutional arrangements for linking farmers with each other and to
marketing channels as well as bringing together public and private
stakeholders (e.g. research, extension, and banking institutions)
(Dorward et al., 2004; Jayne et al., 2010; Spielman et al., 2010). Two
institutional arrangements that are often debated with reference to
Ethiopia and indeed elsewhere are contract farming and farmer co-
operatives, which have been the object of investigation from a theo-
retical and empirical perspective (Biénabe and Sautier, 2005; Holloway
et al., 2000; Abebaw and Haile, 2013).
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Contract farming is an important element in the Ethiopian
Government’s Growth and Transformation Plan II to link small-scale
farmers to sustainable market outlets and promote agricultural devel-
opment. Contract farming is a commercial relationship between farmers
and traders or processors over the production and sale of certain agri-
cultural products, often at pre-agreed quality, quantity and price (Eaton
and Shepherd, 2001). Smallholders might benefit from access to high-
value output market and from the – often included – provisions for
access to credit, technical advisory services and inputs (Jayne et al.,
2004; Barrett et al., 2012; Abate et al., 2014). It may also help reduce
marketing risks by guaranteeing more reliable prices than in the open
market (Kaganzi et al., 2009). As a result, it might lead to increasing
prices for producers and/or marketed quantity, and thereby to higher
incomes.
At the same time, there are concerns about a potential rise in local
inequality as access to contract farming opportunities is potentially
limited to better-off farmers who have the necessary resources and skills
(Barrett et al., 2012). Negative effects may also arise due to increased
exposure to production and marketing risk as well as potential power
imbalances (Sivramkrishna and Jyotishi, 2008). A number of studies
have recently explored these potential effects of contract farming (e.g.
Warning and Key, 2002; Simmons et al., 2005; Rao and Qaim, 2011;
Bellemare, 2012; Narayanan, 2014; Herrmann, 2017). In an early
study, Warning and Key (2002) find substantial income improvements
for peanut farmers producing under contract in Senegal. Rao and Qaim
(2011) find that selling under contracts to supermarkets in Kenya has
positive income effects for vegetable farmers. Bellemare (2012), using
an extensive dataset covering a number of crops, firms and regions of
Madagascar, concludes that contract farming participation leads to
significant income improvements. In Ethiopia, two existing studies on
contract farming, one on castor beans by Negash and Swinnen (2013)
and one on organic honey by Girma and Gardebroek (2015) find po-
sitive effects on food security and incomes, respectively.
A recent systematic review of 26 contract farming arrangements in
13 developing countries by Ton et al. (2017) confirms these positive
income effects, estimating an overall pooled income effect of 38%. Yet,
while only two of the reviewed studies report negative income effects in
some of the contract farming cases (Simmons et al., 2005; Narayanan,
2014), Ton et al. (2017) find large differences depending on type of
contract, crops and the institutional environment. In another recent
study, Ragasa et al. (2018) also show that maize contract farming in
Ghana, while leading to technology adoption and higher yields, did not
increase farm profits. Ton et al. (2017) emphasise that such negative or
insignificant effects are likely to be systematically underrepresented
due to publication and other biases, requiring further rigorous evalua-
tions. They find, for example, that in the majority of cases contract
farmers were better off in terms of land or other wealth categories than
average farmers in the regions.
Farmer cooperatives play a central role in the Ethiopian
Government’s strategy for increasing agricultural productivity, and
could play an even more strategic role in linking farmers to markets
(Bernard and Spielman, 2009; Bernard et al., 2010; Gebreselassie et al.,
2017). Marketing cooperatives may help small-scale producers in
overcoming minimum quantity, quality and frequency of supply con-
straints to participating in higher-value markets and contract farming
schemes (Kaganzi et al., 2009). Collective action, in general, may en-
able farmers to aggregate produce, reducing transaction costs and dis-
economies of scale (Biénabe and Sautier, 2005). It can also enhance
groups’ bargaining power and access to information and help establish
contracts with buyers who require large volumes (Best et al., 2005;
Kwapong and Korugyendo, 2010). Yet, cooperatives can also be in-
struments to reinforce rural elites and the established order, as they
might serve to concentrate market power (Francesconi and Heerink,
2010).
A number of empirical studies find positive effects of cooperatives
on technology adoption (Shiferaw et al., 2008; Abebaw and Haile,
2013), prices (Wollni and Zeller, 2007; Bernard et al., 2008; Shiferaw
et al., 2009), commercialisation (Francesconi and Heerink, 2010) and
farm incomes (Fischer and Qaim, 2012; Ito et al., 2012; Vandeplas
et al., 2013), while others come to more mixed results (e.g.
Mujawamariya et al., 2013; Verhofstadt and Maertens, 2014). While
there is little research in Ethiopia on income effects of cooperatives,
some studies have analysed grain marketing performance, but come to
mixed conclusions. Bernard et al. (2008) do not find effects of grain
cooperatives on agricultural commercialisation on average as well as
for poorer farmers, but find effects on prices, implying some positive
effects on bargaining power. Likewise, Bernard and Spielman (2009)
find that the poorest farmers tend to be excluded from grain marketing
cooperatives, although they might benefit through spillover effects,
such as through higher prices. Francesconi and Heerink (2010) find
higher commercialisation among cooperative members, yet only for
marketing cooperatives, which is consistent with Bernard and Taffesse
(2012) who find declining success in providing marketing services once
a cooperative adopts additional non-marketing-related activities.
This study contributes to the literature on the involvement of
smallholders in agricultural value chains by analysing the impacts on
production and wellbeing brought about by the Agricultural Value
Chains Project in Oromia (AVCPO) in the Bale Zone of Ethiopia. The
AVCPO is a durum wheat VC development project that uses co-
operatives and contract farming arrangements to improve the pro-
ductivity and welfare of smallholders cultivating durum wheat. The
project was implemented by the Ethiopian government in collaboration
with the Italian Development Cooperation between 2011 and 2016.
Its aim was to improve the production and marketing of durum
wheat among smallholders by improving the quality and quantity of
their crops, strengthening cooperatives and establishing direct links
between cooperatives and Ethiopian pasta makers in Addis Ababa
through contract farming agreements. Later on, the Bale Zone was
identified as a durum wheat commercialisation cluster (MAECI, 2016).
This paper has three objectives. The first objective is to investigate
the project’s impact on cereals production. The second objective is to
assess the capacity of the programme to strengthen the role of co-
operatives in marketing durum wheat. The third objective is to explore
the impact the project has had on the wellbeing of farming households,
paying special attention to education and nutrition.
Our evaluation is based on data that was collected in 2014 via a
large-scale household survey. As is common in the evaluation of large
agricultural value chain programmes, we had to rely on cross-sectional
data and retrospective information. In order to assess the AVCPO’s
impacts, we applied an instrumental variable (IV) approach. To test the
robustness of the results, due to the possible violation of the exclusion
restriction assumption, three additional – recently developed – esti-
mation strategies were implemented: a sensitivity analysis approach, an
IV estimation on a sub-sample determined by propensity score
matching (PSM) without replacement and a non-parametric approach.
The remaining paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly in-
troduces the food policies concerning wheat in Ethiopia. Section 3 ex-
plains the AVCPO project and the theory of change that frames our
evaluation. Section 4 discusses the data and methodology. Section 5
presents the results while Section 6 features our concluding remarks
and the policy implications of our findings.
2. Background: the durum wheat sector in Ethiopia
In Ethiopia, wheat and wheat products, including bread and pasta,
have become staple foods over the years. A nationally representative
survey cited in Minot et al. (2015), for example, finds that most urban
households in Ethiopia now consume wheat (nearly 90%). However,
the survey also finds that only around 50% in rural areas consume
wheat products, indicating that purchases increase with urbanisation
and incomes. Since the 1990s, wheat consumption has increased by
4.2% annually, well above the population growth rate (Minot et al.,
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2015). Its share in overall cereals consumption is around 20%, second
only to maize and significantly above most SSA countries (FAOSTAT,
2015).
Ethiopia has been producing wheat for centuries, and is known
worldwide for the genetic diversity of its wheat.1 Wheat cultivation is
concentrated in the central and southern highlands due to favourable
growing conditions (Hailu, 1991; White et al., 2001; Shiferaw et al.,
2014; Minot et al., 2015). In contrast to other SSA countries, wheat is
mainly cultivated through small-scale, rain-fed agriculture. Ethiopia
has an estimated 4.7 to five million wheat farmers, more than 90% of
whom are small-scale farmers who cultivate on less than half a hectare
(Gabre-Madhin, 2001; Minot et al., 2015). Most small-scale farmers are
linked to an agricultural cooperative system (Gabre-Madhin, 2001;
Bernard et al., 2010).
Along with rising demand, wheat farming has more than doubled in
acreage and more than quadrupled in terms of production in the last
two decades, making wheat one of the four major cereals produced in
the country, alongside teff, maize and sorghum (FAOSTAT, 2015).
However, domestic wheat production has been insufficient in recent
years, leading to growing reliance on imports, to an extent not seen in
other agricultural sub-sectors (FAOSTAT, 2015). Imports increased
significantly during the food crisis of 2008–2009, when the government
began providing wheat to large-scale flourmills in order to encourage
the production of subsidised bread (Shiferaw et al., 2014; Minot et al.,
2015; Gebreselassie et al., 2017).2 Increasing pasta consumption has
also led to growing dependency on wheat imports. Indeed, demand for
pasta has grown faster than demand for other wheat-based bread pro-
ducts (Minot et al., 2015). Due to the low quantity and quality of durum
wheat – most wheat produced in Ethiopia is bread wheat with a
homogenous protein content – the pasta industry almost completely
relies on imports to meet their production goals. As a result, durum
wheat imports have accounted for around 50–80% of total wheat im-
ports (Benson et al., 2014).3
According to some researchers (Shiferaw et al., 2011a, 2011b;
Shiferaw et al., 2014), a few areas of Ethiopia have a comparative ad-
vantage in producing wheat. However, low yields and weak market
systems result in insufficient overall domestic supply response. In
2012–2013, wheat yields were estimated to be 2.4 tons per hectare,
which is low compared to other major producers, such as Egypt
(6.7 tons), South Africa (3.4 tons) and Kenya (3.0 tons) (Demeke and Di
Marcantonio, 2013; Minot et al., 2015). Underlying reasons are limited
use of modern inputs and improved varieties – in particular, poor grain
quality –4 and high implicit taxation, including overvalued exchange
rates, export bans, subsidised imported wheat and underdeveloped
market structures (Gabre-Madhin, 2001; Bernard et al., 2010; Demeke
and Di Marcantonio, 2013; Shiferaw et al., 2014; Yirga et al., 2016).
Moreover, seed varieties and quality is a problem that affects how
wheat production among smallholders is marketed. Due to weak price
incentives, non-integrated and incomplete markets, and low pro-
ductivity, less than 30% of Ethiopian wheat is sold through the market
(Demeke and Di Marcantonio, 2013; Minot et al., 2015). In addition to
low marketed volume – due to lack of market information, shortage of
working capital, and price instability – local wheat is mostly marketed
through overly complicated systems (Gabre-Madhin, 2001), with many
private traders aggregating the quantity of wheat without considering
quality and timing (Gebreselassie et al., 2017), both of which are im-
portant to the country’s pasta producers (Chiari, 2015).5 At the same
time, there have been substantial investments in large-scale flour mills,
suggesting that the potential is there to improve grain markets (Benson
et al., 2014).
Historically, increasing the production of wheat and other cereals
has been an important policy objective of the Ethiopian government
(Spielman et al., 2010). The National Wheat Research Program
(NWRP), for instance, was enacted in order to generate basic scientific
information and applied technology that could increase and sustain
wheat production in Ethiopia (Hailu, 1991).6 The grain market was
liberalised in March 1990. Restrictions on private inter-regional trade
were removed, official pricing and quotas were abolished and the
marketing board’s monopoly status was eliminated. However, ac-
cording to Gabre-Madhin (2001), the market remained “efficient but
poor” because market development was relatively limited.
The production of wheat and other cereals has also become an im-
portant part of several development strategies in Ethiopia, including the
Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) and the Agriculture
Development-Led Industrialization (ALDI) policy, both of which were
created to foster industrial development and food security through
agriculture. Smallholder commercialisation is recognised as a major
source of agricultural growth and transformation, which requires es-
tablishing appropriate marketing systems and VCs, while also
strengthening both cooperatives and the private sector (Growth and
Transformation Program, 2013–15).
The Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA) has been established
by the Ethiopian government to strengthen the wheat VC as a strategic
sub-sector that can help promote food security and agricultural growth.
Likewise, the multi-stakeholder Agricultural Growth Program (AGP)
aims at supporting farmer cooperative unions and agribusinesses,
raising the production and productivity of wheat and wheat VCs, and
increasing the domestic supply. Meanwhile, agricultural cooperatives
have been playing an important role in the sector’s attempt to increase
productivity, and have become increasingly involved in the commer-
cialisation of cereals (Bernard et al., 2008; Wanyama et al., 2009;
Bernard et al., 2010; Francesconi and Heerink, 2010; Abebaw and
Haile, 2013).
3. The Agricultural Value Chains Project in Oromia (AVCPO)
The AVCPO was presided over by several Ethiopian stakeholders as
part of the Ethiopian-Italian cooperation framework between 2011 and
2016.7 It was based on a pre-existing large-scale Ethiopian-Italian de-
velopment project in the region, specifically the Arsi-Bale Rural De-
velopment Project8 and involved a variety of different local actors –
most notably cooperatives, local public research centres and govern-
ment actors from the state and local levels.
The project is located in the wheat production area of the Bale Zone.
Despite being part of one of the main wheat-producing areas of Ethiopia
– the Federal State of Oromia – the Bale Zone has in the past been
classified as a minor wheat-producing area (Hailu, 1991). Bernard et al.
(2010) claim that it has low market access. Most wheat is grown
1 http://wheatatlas.org/country/varieties/ETH/0.
2 Ethiopia has been the largest recipient of foreign food aid in SSA, most of which
consists of wheat from the United States (Demeke & Di Marcantonio, 2013).
3 Durum wheat is considered indigenous in Ethiopia, but has been increasingly re-
placed by bread wheat (Benson et al., 2014). This is due to durum wheat’s relatively low
yields, low producer prices and weak tools for linking farmers to markets (Benson et al.,
2014).
4 Though modern technologies are being embraced more and more – an estimated 73%
of wheat areas in Ethiopia are fertilized – improved crop varieties are not being used to a
great extent (Yirga et al., 2016), tractor use is rare and poor crop management is common
(Demeke & Di Marcantonio, 2013; Minot et al., 2015). However, rental services for
ploughing wheat are becoming more common in commercial wheat growing areas, in-
cluding the Bale Zone (Minot et al., 2015).
5 Cooperatives play a minor role in marketing wheat (Minot et al., 2015; Gebreselassie
et al., 2017). They are most active in the distribution of fertiliser.
6 The programme had four main dimensions: a zonal dimension (six major wheat-
producing regions were selected, including the Bale Zone and Sinana, the latter of which
served as a research centre); a disciplinary dimension (with a focus on vertical breeding,
genetics research, wheat pathology, entomology and research-extension); a client di-
mension and a resource dimension (Hailu, 1991).
7 The AVCPO was financed by the Italian Development Corporation and received
technical assistance from the Overseas Agronomic Institute.
8 The Arsi-Bali project was a rural development initiative that was overseen by the
Italian Development Corporation from 1996 to 2004.
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between 1800 and 2500m above sea level. The project area is flat and
located at an (average) elevation of 2000m above sea level. It has re-
latively homogeneous socio-economic conditions, agro-climatic condi-
tions (e.g. soil types), rainfall levels and moisture types (BDoFED,
2004).
3.1. Objectives and main features
The AVCPO’s general aim is to raise domestic production of durum
wheat and facilitate greater access to value added markets. At the core
of its strategy is an attempt to enable smallholders to produce large
amounts of high-quality durum wheat that will meet the demands of the
domestic pasta industry and increase the bargaining power of small-
holders. The project identified a number of production and coordina-
tion problems that prevented farmers from achieving satisfactory re-
sults in terms of the quantity, quality and timing of production (see
Table 1).
In 2011, the AVCPO launched a series of interlinked actions ad-
dressing two main areas: The first is focused on technical aspects of
production, including the proliferation of appropriate agronomic
practices, the introduction of adapted durum wheat varieties and the
provision of key assets at the cooperative level. The second area con-
cerned the overall institutional architecture of the VC – paying special
attention to capacity-building among cooperatives, establishing links
between cooperatives and public agricultural research centres and
using cooperatives to establish contract farming arrangements, not
practiced previously in the region. These arrangements involved es-
tablishing contracts between cooperatives and pasta makers as well as
between cooperatives and the farmers (Chiari, 2015). Incentives aimed
at ensuring that cooperatives and farmers adhere to their contracts
include significant price increases that are based on verified quality
parameters (namely, the protein content of durum wheat).
The AVCPO was expected to induce a change in the power relations
within the VC. Farmers in local markets are often negatively affected by
the greater bargaining power of traders, intermediaries and lenders
(Biggeri et al., 2017; Sultan, 2016). The ability of cooperatives to act as
a link between farmers and the pasta industry was expected to result in
a redistribution of bargaining power in favour of the farmers.
According to the data collected by the Sinana Agricultural Research
Centre in the AVCPO area – where about 140,000 ha are cultivated with
bread wheat every year – the project worked with 15 cooperatives and
second-level associations (e.g. unions). According to internal mon-
itoring data, durum wheat production in the project area increased
thirtyfold between 2012 and 2015 (Chiari, 2015).
3.2. Rationale and impact framework
The AVCPO has implemented a two-pronged approach to upgrading
small-scale cereals production, emphasising, in particular, technical
improvements and improvements to the VC’s institutional architecture.
The effectiveness of the AVCPO depends on how these approaches in-
teract with each other, as farm-level impacts are only achievable as long
as action is taken collectively. For instance, the use of improved seeds is
only sustainable if farmers, cooperatives and public agricultural re-
search centres are connected in a sound durum wheat seed production
cycle. Moreover, since the quality of durum wheat is measured at the
cooperative/area level, individual farmers are only incentivised to in-
vest in qualitative activities – such as better training, higher quality
seeds and more fertiliser – if other members of the cooperative do
likewise.
Direct access to national markets, especially through cooperatives, is
expected to increase the bargaining power of farmers. Moreover, the al-
ternative marketing channels that are made available through cooperatives
may induce competition, as other intermediaries might be compelled to
offer competitive prices. Perhaps more importantly, the transformations
associated with having better access to national markets might allow
smallholders to produce higher value crops, which will in turn allow
farmers to retain a greater share of the added value. These induced changes
in the production and market system are expected to increase farmers’
wheat revenues by increasing the prices and/or quantity that is produced
and sold. Household income may rise as long as additional costs are lower
than the revenue increases. Through an increase in household income, the
project might then improve other dimensions of farmers’ wellbeing, such as
food security, education and health (see Fig. 1).
Regardless, the transformations brought about by the AVCPO may
potentially introduce undesired effects. For instance, more profitable
crops might encourage less sustainable forms of land use (e.g. reduced
crop rotation) or crowd out traditional crops (e.g. emmer wheat, teff or
barley). Another point worth mentioning is the possibility that factors
beyond the AVCPO’s control may influence its effectiveness,
Table 1
Major bottlenecks addressed by AVCPO regarding the durum wheat VC.
Source: Adapted by authors from (Biggeri et al., 2017).
Bottleneck Actions Actors involved
Small size of farms (and small per-farm
production)
– Strengthening cooperatives
– Creation of cooperative’s unions
– Construction of new storage facilities at cooperative/kebele level
– Cooperatives
– Unions
– Farmers
– Regional and Zonal Institutions
High risk aversion of farmers – Creation of contract farming schemes to link farmers and processing
industries
– Quality premium in price setting
– Peer learning
– Cooperatives & Unions
– Pasta producers
– Sinana Agricultural Research Centre (quality lab
checks)
– Regional and Zonal Institutions
Low quality of production
(i.e. low protein content)
– Training of farmers (fertilisation, appropriate farming practices, etc.)
– Selecting new adapted (patented by research institutions) varieties of
durum wheat seeds
– Creating a seed value chain involving seed multiplier cooperatives and
agricultural research centres
– Providing seed grading machines to cooperatives (still not operational
at the time of evaluation)
– Training on appropriate nitrogen fertilisation
– Farmers
– Sinana Agricultural Research Centre
– Selected farmers devoted to the cycle of seed
production
– The AVCO programme directly via cooperatives
– Oromia Agriculture Research Centre (OARI)
Insufficient coordination among actors along
the VC
– Strengthening and involving local institutions in the value chain
– Capacity building of cooperatives by strengthening technical and
managerial skills
– Sharing experience and creating awareness among farmers and
cooperative managers
– Regional and Zonal Institutions
– International consultants
– Cooperatives & Unions
– Pasta producers
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particularly natural disasters such as drought or floods. The political
stability of the area and ethnic tensions might also undermine the
AVCPO’s efforts to establish a positive business climate and forge sound
cross-level interactions between stakeholders. Price instability in the
international and national grain markets could also hinder the AVCPO’s
efforts, as Ethiopia is still heavily reliant on foreign imports of both
grain and fertilisers.
4. Methodology
In order to evaluate the project’s effects, a large-scale household survey
was conducted in 2014.9 The data was then analysed using several different
econometric techniques. The information gathered from in-depth interviews
with key stakeholders, including AVCPO staff and researchers from the Si-
nana Agricultural Research Center (SARC),10 were used to formulate the
questionnaire, to identify participating cooperatives and farmers (the
treatment) as well as to develop the sample design.
4.1. Sample design and data collection
Among all the cooperatives interested in introducing durum wheat
in their area, the AVCPO selected those that were previously involved in
the Arsi-Bale Rural Development Project. The latter was implemented
in a specific sub-area of the Bale Zone, characterised by homogenous
socio-economic and agro-ecological conditions (mostly flat land and
with two rainy seasons). The other cooperatives operating in this sub-
area, including those that were eventually selected as part of the control
group for this study, were permitted to join the AVCPO in 2015, when
the scaling-up phase of the project began.
The sample design therefore included two stages: selection of
treated and non-treated cooperatives followed by a random sampling of
smallholders based on the list of farmers provided by the AVCPO. Based
on a power analysis, the farmers’ sample consisted of 752 households,
with households in the control group oversampled.11
Ten out of the fifteen AVCPO cooperatives were selected in our
sample (five had already left the programme by the time of the
survey).12 The non-treated cooperatives were selected according to a
set of criteria established a priori:
• these cooperatives were supposed to have been part of the previous
Arsi-Bale Rural Development Project;
• they were located far enough from the treated cooperatives to avoid
spillover effects;
• they were located in areas comparable to the treated ones in terms
of agro-ecological characteristics;
• they did not experience extreme climate shock during the reference
cropping season.
A potential group of 32 control cooperatives was initially identified. A total
number of 12 non-treated cooperatives were then selected on the basis of the
Fig. 1. AVCPO impact framework.
Source: Authors.
9 A small pilot survey involving 20 smallholders was carried out to test the ques-
tionnaire and to verify the goodness of retrospective information gathered.
10 SARC is the regional state-owned research institution that serves as a branch office
of the OARI in the Bale Zone. The OARI’s role in the AVCPO was to develop and release
improved durum wheat varieties and supervise all value chain activities.
11 Two variables, taken from the statistics of SARC, were chosen to calculate the power
analysis ex-ante: the percentage of smallholder farmers cultivating cereals in the area
(95.2%) and the percentage of smallholder farmers who did not deliver their cereals to
the cooperative (96.5%). According to these two statistics, the number of households that
needed to be interviewed were 752 and 556 with 1% error (188 and 138 with 2% error).
A total of 751 farming households completed the interview. The validity of the power
analysis was confirmed ex-post on these and other relevant variables used in the analysis.
12 Two cooperatives were excluded at an early stage because they were unable to carry
out various activities, while three cooperatives dropped out due to adverse natural con-
ditions.
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above-mentioned criteria. In each cooperative, 30–40 farmers were randomly
selected from a complete list of farmers. The map of the area and the location
of the cooperatives are presented in Fig. 2. According to research conducted in
2004, these cooperatives are located in an area with similar average annual
amounts of rainfall (1000–1200mm), elevation, soil quality, moisture, hu-
midity, crop cultivation typologies and socio-economic characteristics
(BDoFED, 2004). These factors are also explained in Fig. 2 and Table 2.
In ten AVCPO cooperatives, both farmers participating in the
AVCPO (Groups F-a and F-b in Fig. 2) and non-participating farmers of
the same cooperatives (Group D) were randomly selected (30–40
farmers in each cooperative).
Fig. 3 presents the structure of participation in the AVCPO within
the treated woredas (districts), identifying different groups of treated
and non-treated farmers based on their role in the evaluation. Among
the treated farmers, two groups can be identified. Group F-a are treated
farmers who agreed to sell their harvest directly to pasta producing
factories by delivering their production to cooperatives. Their relative
prevalence varies from one cooperative and woreda to another (i.e. it is
close to 100% in Golocha, but lower in other woredas).
Group F-b is composed of farmers who are part of the project, but
sold their durum wheat through channels other than the cooperative.13
These farmers are also considered part of the treated group (according
to our definition), since the project cannot exclude that local mid-
dlemen may have decided to offer higher prices as a reaction to the new
system created by the AVCPO.
Among the non-treated farmers, only 2 of the 6 potential groups
were used in the analysis.14 Group B is composed of farmers who are
members of a non-treated cooperative (i.e. living in a non-treated ke-
bele – the lowest administrative unit in Ethiopia – as each kebele has
only one cooperative). This group can be used as a control group if
three conditions are met: (i) The kebele is comparable to treated ke-
beles in terms of agro-ecological, socioeconomic and demographic
conditions; (ii) the kebele is willing to join the programme in the near
future15 and (iii) there is no evidence of spillover resulting from the
treatment to this kebele. Insofar as the last point is concerned, SARC
researchers have found that many non-treated kebeles – especially Si-
nana Woreda – can be used as a control group because they are far
enough from the treatment area that the risk of spillover is almost zero.
Finally, Group D is composed of farmers who are members of one of the
Fig. 2. Location, soils, average rainfall and elevation of Bale Zone and cooperatives surveyed.
Source: BDoFED (2004).
13 The reason that pushed many farmers to sell via other channels is the sudden and
sharp rise in durum wheat prices that occurred during the 2013 harvest season. The rise
in the durum wheat price was chiefly due to reduced imports from Ukraine (as a result of
political instability) and to the volatility of international markets (Ukrstat, 2011–2014;
UNCTAD, 2011–2014). Therefore, the prevailing local market price at harvest time was
higher than the price stated by the factories a few months before. Ethiopian government
interventions such as cereals acquisition and storage were central to reducing the pressure
on prices for staple foods.
14 Group A is composed of farmers who are not officially members of cooperatives, but
live in a treated kebele. This group cannot be used as a control group as these farmers
cannot be easily identified and they are structurally different from treated farmers in that
they are not involved in any form of collective action. Group C is composed of farmers
who are not members of cooperatives living in a non-treated kebele: This makes them
unsuitable to act as a control group. Group E is composed of farmers who are members of
a non-treated cooperative in a treated kebele. Only in a few kebeles are there more than
one cooperative. However, the risk of trickle-down and spillover of the treatment is ex-
tremely high and this group was therefore excluded from the control group.
15 Based on information obtained in 2018 from the Italian Development Cooperation
Agency branch office in Addis Ababa, 10 out of the 12 cooperatives (83.3%) included as
the control group have actually joined AVCPO since 2014.
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cooperatives involved in the AVCPO, but did not agree to join the
project. The size of this group is dependent on the size of the area. They
can help identify the factors that systematically influence the pro-
gramme’s uptake.
For the purposes of this evaluation, we considered farmers that met
the following requirements as “treated”: (i) they were members of an
AVCPO cooperative;16 (ii) they had participated in at least one AVCPO
activity17 and (iii) they had agreed to grow durum wheat.18 As shown
in Table 3, the degree of overlap between the treatment definitions is
quite high. Indeed, only 27 out of 293 durum wheat growers did not
take part in at least one AVCPO activity, and only 41 farmers who were
involved with the AVCPO decided not to grow durum wheat.
4.2. Outcome variables
The questionnaire used in the survey includes several modules, re-
lated to agricultural activities and socio-economic outcomes. Questions
concerning inputs and outputs of the production process as well as asset
ownership and social capital were collected for 2013 and, retro-
spectively, for 2010 (just before the beginning of the programme).
Three outcome variables were selected to measure the effects of
AVCPO on agricultural activities: two related to the production side and
one related to the delivery of cereals production to the cooperative
(Table 4). The first one is the increase in gross value of cereals pro-
duction per hectare between 2010 and 2013 (using 2013 constant
prices) – this outcome is used to measure the success of the project in
terms of production.19 The second outcome is the net value of the
cereals production per hectare per family labour unit (FLU),20 which is
taken as a proxy for household income. This is justified by the fact that
all the interviewees identified agriculture as their main source of in-
come and that the data clearly indicates that cereals production is the
main component of agricultural activities: based on the descriptive
statistics in Table 4, 82–84% of land was used for cereals before the
intervention. To convey an idea of the relative contribution of agri-
culture, the average annual net household income from cereals pro-
duction is 44,000 Ethiopian Birr (ETB) while the income from livestock
is about 3700 ETB. The third variable is the share of cereals production
value sold through the cooperatives.21 This outcome allows identifying
the AVCPO’s effectiveness in the creation of a viable alternative to local
markets and middlemen/intermediaries.22
Moreover, this paper provides an analysis of the AVCPO’s effects on
two important wellbeing outcomes: food security and access to educa-
tion. Food security is measured through two different variables. The
Table 2
Characteristics of the areas where surveyed cooperatives are located.
Source: BDoFED (2004).
Woreda Cooperative AVCPO Relief
elevation
(m.a.s.l)
Mean annual
rainfall (m.m.)
Soil type
quality
Crop production
system zone
Number of
members
Thermal
zone C°
Length of
growing
period (days)
Geology
Agarfa Agarfa1T Yes 2000–2500 1000–1100 Pellic
vertisoils
Barley, wheat,
pulses
551 15–20 300–365 Quaternary
Undifferentia-ted,
Ginir Formation
Q.U.G.F
Agarfa2T Yes 509
Agarfa1C No 416
Agarfa2C No 329
Agarfa3C No 547
Sinana Sinana3T Yes 2000–2500 1000–1100 Pellic
vertisoils
Barley, wheat,
teff, pulses
638 15–20 300–365 Q.U.G.F
Sinana4T Yes 963
Sinana4C No 1168
Sinana5C No 649
Sinana6C No 785
Goro Goro5T Yes 1800–2200 1000–1100 Pellic
vertisoils and
others
Barley, wheat,
teff, pulses
1572 15–20 300–365 Q.U.G.F
Ginir Ginir6T Yes 1800–2200 1000–1200 Pellic
vertisoils
Barley, wheat,
teff, pulses
494 15–20 240–300 Q.U.G.F
Ginir7T Yes 653
Ginir8T Yes 684
Gololcha
(Jara)
Jara9T Yes 1900–2500 1000–1200 Pellic
vertisoils
Barley, wheat,
teff, pulses
673 15–20 240–300 Q.U.G.F
Jara10T Yes 486
Goba Goba7C No 2000–2500 1000–1100 Pellic
vertisoils
Barley, wheat,
teff, pulses
212 12–18 300–365 Oligocene Miocene,
Arsi Bale BasaltsGoba8C No 285
Goba9C No 373
Gassera Gassera10C No 2000–2500 1000–1200 Pellic
vertisoils
Barley, wheat,
teff, pulses
541 15–20 240–365 Q.U.G.F
Gassera11C No 557
Gassera 12C No 658
Note: All cooperatives are part of the hydrographic system of Weybirr, Tectonics based on Mesozoic tertiary cover of plateau, Tertiary mainly lower tertiary volcanic
basalts, The Climatic classification: vegetation warm temperate humid.
16 Note that this condition is a pre-condition for participating in AVCPO activities.
17 At the farmer level, the AVCPO consisted of several proposed activities (training,
storage facilities and purchase of high-quality durum wheat seeds) and farmers could
choose to join one or more of these activities.
18 It is worth remembering that durum wheat cultivation, although quite widespread
in the past, was almost absent before the AVCPO began.
19 This is the only dependent variable calculated using retrospective information.
While, in general, some caution is needed when retrospective information is used, we
noticed that interviewees had no difficulties in recalling 2010 data, especially about their
key livelihood, agriculture. A similar approach was used by several other authors in this
field (e.g. Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Ito et al., 2012; Herrmann, 2017).
20 The net value is computed as the gross value – non-labour input cost – hired labour
cost. The family labour unit (FLU) was calculated taking into consideration family
members involved in agricultural activities adjusted for their effort. The effort was esti-
mated by enquiring the average number of hours worked per week during the 2013 main
cropping season.
21 The share of cereals value was preferred to the share of cereals quantity to have a
more homogeneous unit of measure (as cereals prices may be quite different). As a ro-
bustness check, all the empirical analyses were also implemented to the quantity of
production, revealing very similar results.
22 Given the legally binding nature of the contract between cooperatives and the pasta
company, it is very likely that nearly all of the produce of these cooperatives has been
sold to the company. Observations during the qualitative interviews support this argu-
ment.
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first is the household dietary diversity score, which is calculated as the
number of different food groups that the household has consumed the
day before the interview (Swindale and Bilinsky, 2006). It can poten-
tially range from 0 (no food group consumed) to 16 (all food groups
consumed). The second indicator is calculated in line with the House-
hold Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS), but is based on a smaller set
of questions as compared to the original one (Coates et al., 2007). This
indicator is calculated by aggregating self-reported information on
people’s frequency of use of coping strategies ranging from the mod-
erate (eating a smaller meal) to the extreme (experiencing lack of food
of any type). Extreme forms of food insecurity are not present among
the sampled households, as nearly 94% of them never had to resort to
any of these coping strategies. We also analyse the project’s effects on
farmers’ frequency of relying on two of these coping strategies (the
other two have no variability): these variables take value 0, 1 or 2
depending on whether farmers experienced that event never, some-
times or often, respectively.
Concerning education, the selected outcome is the share of family
members aged 6–18 who are currently attending some kind of formal
education. This variable is further disaggregated by gender.
Finally, this paper takes into consideration possible crowding-out
effects of durum wheat production expansion. In the Bale Zone, the
Fig. 3. Structure of participation/non-participation in the AVCPO.
Source: Authors.
Table 3
Overlap and differences according to different definitions of treatment.
Source: Authors.
Participation in at least 1 AVCPO activity
At least 1 small plot for durum
wheat
Non-treated Treated Total
Non-treated 417 41 458
(55.53%) (5.46%) (60.99%)
Treated 27 266 293
(3.60%) (35.42%) (39.01%)
Total 444 307 751
(59.12%) (40.88%) (100.00%)
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availability of new land for cultivation is close to zero. That means that
it is not possible to expand the area for durum wheat cultivation
without having effects on other uses. Three potential substitution ef-
fects were examined. First, durum wheat area expansion could have
caused a reduction in crop rotation, and in particular rotation from
cereals to grazing/fallow and from cereals to pulses (i.e. a practice to
maintain and restore soil fertility). Second, it could have crowded out
horticulture and other non-cereal crops. Finally, durum wheat could
have replaced bread wheat (cash crop vs. cash crop) or other minor
cereals (cash crop vs. food crop).
4.3. Econometric strategy
Given that treatment assignment was based on the willingness of
individual farmers to join AVCPO activities, in principle, we cannot
exclude the possibility that individual or household characteristics in-
fluenced the probability of joining the AVCPO. Moreover, it may be the
case that at least some of these relevant characteristics are un-
observable. For instance, farmers who are more entrepreneurial, less
risk-averse, more skilled or more confident in their abilities are prob-
ably more likely to accept the treatment than others.23 The use of
propensity score matching techniques could therefore lead to a biased
measurement of the impact due to selection of unobservables, a
common problem when specific units (e.g. farmers) are free to accept
(or refuse) an innovation (Barrett et al., 2012). An IV approach has
often been used as a remedy to assess the impact of interventions en-
compassing contract farming schemes (e.g. Bellemare, 2012), small-
holders’ involvement in agro-industrial activities (Maertens and
Swinnen, 2009) or their adoption of improved varieties (Sanglestsawai
et al., 2014; Yirga et al., 2016).
Against this background, it is worth exploring the reasoning for the
implementation of an IV procedure to assess the impact of the AVCPO.
The IV setting is as follows:
Y Dβ Xγ ε= + + (1a)
D Zπ v= + (2a)
where Y is our outcome variable, D is the treatment variable (correlated
with other unobservable variables and, hence, endogenous) and X is a
matrix of other covariates. Z is the instrument(s) that is correlated to
the endogenous treatment but not directly to outcome Y. According to
Angrist and Imbens (1995), a two-stage least squares procedure can be
used to obtain an unbiased estimate of β, as long as the instrument (Z) is
strong/relevant (i.e. correlated to D) and valid (i.e. no direct effect of Z
on Y or exclusion restriction). Through IV and a local average treatment
effect (LATE), only the impact for those units whose treatment status
would change D in case of an exogenous change in the value of the
instrument Z is estimated.
Given this framework, membership of an AVCPO cooperative is a
plausible candidate for an IV. Given that the compliance rate is 66.7%,
the strength of the instrument should not be a problem: This is also
confirmed by the results of the Anderson-Rubin test, reported in the
Appendix (online). The validity (exogeneity) assumption is non-tes-
table. Despite the existence of partial tests, such as the Sargan test, the
validity of the instrument must be supported by the description of the
evaluation setting.
In this evaluation setting, all members of AVCPO cooperatives were
exposed to the possibility of joining the treatment, while members of
non-AVCPO cooperatives were not. There is one single cooperative for
each kebele. In other words, living or not living in an AVCPO kebele
(and, consequently being or not being a member of an AVCPO co-
operative) is chiefly determined by the place of birth (more than 98% of
interviewees still live in the same kebele in which they were born).24
Consequently, from an individual point of view, the assignment of the
intention to treat can be considered random. However, as the first three
columns of Table 5 show, there are statistically significant differences
between farmers that were part of AVCPO cooperatives and those that
were part of non-AVCPO cooperatives in the pre-project phase (2010).
The former were, on average, slightly better endowed in terms of land
Table 4
Outcome variables: descriptive statistics (2013).
Source: Authors.
Total Treated Control
Variables Mean s.d. Mean s.d Mean s.d
Outcomes related to Production
Cereal production growth (2010–2013) (10,000 ETB/ha) 0.62 1.25 1.24 1.24 0.28 1.12
Net value cereal production (10,000 ETB/ha/FLU) 1.21 1.29 1.81 1.44 0.87 1.06
Share of cereal production sold through cooperative 0.09 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.04 0.18
Outcomes related to Land Use
=1 practice crop rotation 0.56 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.57 0.50
Share of cereals on total agricultural land 0.90 0.14 0.91 0.11 0.89 0.15
Share of bread wheat on total cereal area 0.57 0.31 0.36 0.28 0.69 0.27
Share of other cereals on total cereal area 0.16 0.19 0.09 0.11 0.19 0.21
Outcomes related to Education
Share of HH members aged 6–18 in education 0.87 0.01 0.89 0.02 0.87 0.01
Share of male HH members aged 6–18 in education 0.85 0.01 0.87 0.03 0.84 0.02
Share of female HH members aged 6–18 in education 0.91 0.1 0.94 0.02 0.89 0.02
Outcomes related to Food Security
Household food insecurity access scale (HFIAS) 0.12 0.53 0.02 0.21 0.17 0.64
Frequency of “eating smaller meals” (never sometimes often) 0.07 0.31 0.01 0.11 0.11 0.37
Frequency of “eating fewer meals” (never sometimes often) 0.04 0.25 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.29
Household dietary diversity score 9.55 1.73 9.73 1.77 9.46 1.71
Note: ETB stands for Ethiopian Birr (the national currency). Based on the 2014 exchange rate, 10,000 ETB correspond to approximately 384.6 Euro.
23 One part of our questionnaire focused on risk. People were asked to choose between
two different options in a hypothetical situation: one option involved greater risk than the
other. Depending on how they answered previous questions, participants may be asked to
answer up to five questions. Our analysis shows that AVCPO participants are significantly
less risk-averse than non-participants. However, this information should be taken with a
grain of salt, as it refers to the post-intervention period rather than the pre-intervention
period. For this reason, we decided to exclude this variable from the econometric esti-
mates.
24 It is possible to exclude that farmers moved to AVCPO kebeles to join the project:
Given Ethiopian land property rights, land belongs to the state and farmers have the
formal right to use and to bequeath it, but not to sell or buy it.
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and productive assets, characterised by a higher pre-AVCPO soil pro-
ductivity, and less exposed to natural hazards, such as flood and frost.
This means that the instrument could influence the outcomes through
channels other than participation in the AVCPO, therefore violating the
exclusion restriction assumption.
Given this framework, the instrument is unlikely to be exogenous.
Consequently, we employed three different strategies to relax the re-
striction assumption. First, we conducted a sensitivity analysis fol-
lowing the procedure proposed by Conley et al. (2012) and oper-
ationalised by Clarke and Matta (2017).25 In brief, the effect of the
violation of the restriction assumption can be modelled by specifying
different ranges of values for the ϑ coefficient (i.e. specifying ϑmax and
ϑmin).26 This way we can obtain confidence intervals for β, the impact
coefficient.
Y Dβ Xγ Z εϑ= + + + (1b)
D Zπ v= + (2b)
The second strategy consists of a two-step procedure. First, we used
pre-treatment variables in order to perform a PSM estimation using a
calliper (neighbour matching without replacement) on the intention to
treat (i.e. Z in Eq. (1)) as treatment variable. The rationale for this first
step is to manage pre-project unbalances of key variables. A calliper
equal to 0.025 has been used to calibrate the matching and obtain a
more than sufficient reduction of the pre-matching bias.
Table 5 reports the variables used for matching and clearly shows
that post-matching mean differences are not significant (see the last
three columns of Table 5) and that the matching procedure proved to be
able to re-balance pre-matching systematic differences between project
and control areas. This is confirmed by the standard matching quality
statistics (Table 6). The critical values proposed by Rubin (2001) are
respected: post-matching, Rubin’s B is below 25 and Rubin’s R is within
the 0.5–2 range.27
Once non-matched observations are dropped, the resulting sub-
sample is composed of 603 units: 161 treated and 442 control (in-
cluding 90 non-compliers living in AVCPO cooperatives). Then, we ran
the IV estimation on this sub-sample.
A third strategy for dealing with a strong but potentially en-
dogenous instrument is the one elaborated by Frölich (2007) and op-
erationalised by Frölich and Melly (2010), who proposed a fully non-
parametric estimator for estimating LATE with covariates: The instru-
ment is supposed to satisfy the exclusion restriction conditioning only
on a set of covariates X.
Let β be the LATE estimate. Considering the conditional mean
functions:
m x E Y X x Z z( ) [ | ; ]z = = = (3)
μ x E D X x Z z( ) [ | ; ]z = = = (4)
the proposed way to get β (i.e. the ratio between two matching in-
dicators) is:
Table 5
Pre- and post-matching differences between farmers from AVCPO and non-AVCPO cooperatives.
Source: Authors.
Variable (pre-AVCPO) Pre-Matching Means Post Matching Means
(a) AVCPO Coop (b) Non-AVCPO Coop (a)–(b) (c) AVCPO Coop (d) Non-AVCPO Coop (c)–(d)
Household asset
Value of owned livestock (BIRR) 55,267 56,092 −825 54,791 53,573 1218
Value of agricultural assets (BIRR) 2829 2656 173 3113 2950 163 *
Value of HH productive plants (BIRR) 4957 3241 1716 ** 3341 3901 −560
Farm size (ha) 3.95 3.5 0.45 ** 3.75 3.61 0.14
=1 HH owned a horse kart 0.13 0.15 −0.02 0.15 0.14 0.01
=1 HH owned at least 1 mobile 0.33 0.32 0.01 0.33 0.33 0
=1 HH owned at least 1 radio 0.41 0.41 0 0.42 0.4 0.02
=1 the dwelling has a roof in iron 0.75 0.63 0.12 *** 0.67 0.69 −0.02
=1 HH has access to piped water 0.40 0.34 0.06 * 0.4 0.4 0
Agro-ecological characteristics
=1 the farm experienced flood 0.30 0.43 −0.13 *** 0.4 0.4 0.01
=1 the farm experienced a drought 0.06 0.07 −0.01 0.06 0.06 0
=1 the farm experienced frost 0.08 0.13 −0.05 ** 0.1 0.1 0
Bread wheat yields (q/ha) 28.87 26.43 2.44 * 25.61 25.38 0.23
Share of land cropped with cereal 0.84 0.82 0.02 0.83 0.85 −0.01
Household characteristics
Number of adults equivalent 5.85 5.39 0.46 ** 5.5 5.65 −0.15
=1 HH head is Muslim 0.64 0.45 0.19 ** 0.54 0.57 −0.02
=1 HH head is a man 0.96 0.95 0.01 0.96 0.96 0
Age of HH head 41.79 44.16 −2.37 * 42.96 42.89 0.07
Year of education of HH head 5.56 5.32 0.24 5.4 5.42 −0.02
Social participation
Participation in coops (score 1–4) 3 2.95 0.05 2.95 2.94 0.01
Trust toward coops (score 1–4) 2.91 2.96 −0.05 2.93 2.93 0
Social participation (score 0–7) 1.96 1.82 0.14 * 1.83 1.88 −0.05
Infrastructure
Dist. from coop office (in min) 13.52 14.5 −0.98 * 14.24 13.9 0.34
Dist. from mobile network (in min) 3.42 4.7 −1.28 4.07 3.97 0.1
Dist. from health service (in min) 24.67 21.52 3.15 * 22.07 22.37 −0.3
*=10% confidence level; **= 5% confidence level; ***=1% confidence level.
25 In order to implement this procedure, we utilised the user-written command plau-
sexog in the statistical software Stata, version 13.
26 An alternative approach starts from the specification of the parameters of the dis-
tribution of .
27 Rubin’s B is the absolute standardised difference of the means of the linear index of
the propensity score in the treated and (matched) non-treated group; Rubin’s R is the ratio
of treated to (matched) non-treated variances of the propensity score index.
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1 0
1 0
=
∑ −
∑ − (5)
We are confident that these different estimation strategies allow the
elimination of a substantial part of the potential biases. However, given
the use of retrospective information and less-than-perfect identification
strategy, we cannot exclude that the results on the project’s effects may
be upwardly biased.
5. Results
The results of the standard IV estimations and the sensitivity ana-
lysis are reported in Table 7, where the values of β for the three out-
comes for different values of ϑ are displayed.28 The first row of the table
shows the values of β with ϑ 0= , which is the standard IV impact es-
timate. These initial results indicate that treated farmers experienced a
higher growth in the gross production of cereals per hectare in value –
around 13,900 ETB higher, in fact. The growth among participating
farmers in the period 2010–2013 is nearly five times stronger than in
the control group. Moreover, the project has increased the net value of
production per FLU by around 8900 ETB per hectare, which corre-
sponds to an increase by about 102%. Finally, AVCPO has contributed
to a rise in the share of production sold through the cooperative by 18%
(from an average of 2% in the control group to an average of 20% in the
treated group). In Table 5 we noticed that, on average, households from
project areas are richer, more endowed in land and less hit by climate
hazards than households from control areas. This justifies the hypoth-
esis that ϑ 0≥ – that is to say that living in an AVCPO area might be
positively linked to better outcomes (besides actual participation in
AVCPO activities). Starting from this plausible left hand side limit of ϑ,
the magnitude of ϑ has been progressively increased to identify the
right hand side limit (i.e. the highest value of ϑ for wich we can observe
a significant beta coefficient).
The sensitivity analysis shows that the impact estimate is still sig-
nificantly different from zero with quite high values of ϑ (comparing ϑ
with the baseline value of β). For example, impact estimates about
production growth “tolerate” a ϑ 0.9max = starting from a given baseline
β 1.39= with ϑ 0min = .
As a second strategy, we ran IV estimations on a sub-sample of
treated and control farmers, where only observations matching the
nearest neighbour method were used. The results of the IV estimation
on the sub-sample (see Table 8) are in line with estimates found via the
standard IV procedure.
Lastly, Table 9 presents the non-parametric LATE estimates, which
were computed by applying the estimator proposed by Frölich
(2007).29 The estimates are in line with both the baseline IV estimates
and the IV with PSM estimates. These results support evidence showing
that the AVCPO has had a positive and significant impact on the three
outcome variables. They also suggest that the findings seem to be robust
Table 6
Matching quality statistics.
Source: Authors.
Sample Pseudo R2 LR chi2 Mean stand. bias Median stand. bias Rubin's B Rubin's R % Variance
Before matching 0.10 101.86 12.4 10.5 77.3 0.92 33
After matching 0.01 6.11 3.3 3.3 22.1 1.18 20
Table 7
Estimates of the impact of AVCPO: sensitivity analysis.
Source: Authors.
Growth of cereal production value Net value of cereal production Share of production sold through coops
ϑmin ϑmax β β 95% confidence interval β β 95% confidence interval β β 95% confidence interval
β −1.96se β +1.96se β −1.96se β +1.96se β −1.96se β +1.96se
0 0 1.39 1.13 1.64 0.89 0.65 1.13 0.18 0.14 0.21
0 0.1 1.15 0.98 1.32 0.81 0.63 0.99 0.10 0.06 0.14
0 0.2 1.08 0.98 1.17 0.73 0.63 0.84 0.03 −0.09 0.14
0 0.3 1.00 0.98 1.01 0.66 0.63 0.69 −0.05 −0.23 0.14 ■
0 0.4 0.92 0.86 0.98 0.58 0.54 0.63 −0.12 −0.38 0.14 ■
0 0.5 0.85 0.71 0.98 0.51 0.38 0.63 −0.19 −0.52 0.14 ■
0 0.6 0.77 0.56 0.98 0.43 0.23 0.63 −0.26 −0.66 0.14 ■
0 0.7 0.69 0.40 0.98 0.35 0.08 0.63 −0.33 −0.81 0.14 ■
0 0.8 0.62 0.25 0.98 0.28 −0.07 0.63 ■ −0.40 −0.95 0.14 ■
0 0.9 0.54 0.10 0.98 0.20 −0.22 0.63 ■ −0.48 −1.09 0.14 ■
0 1.0 0.47 −0.05 0.98 ■ 0.13 −0.37 0.63 ■ −0.55 −1.23 0.14 ■
0 1.1 0.39 −0.20 0.98 ■ 0.06 −0.51 0.63 ■ −0.62 −1.37 0.14 ■
0 1.2 0.32 −0.35 0.98 ■ −0.02 −0.66 0.63 ■ −0.69 −1.52 0.14 ■
■=0 is included in the 95% confidence interval.
Table 8
Estimates of the impact of AVCPO with PSM+ IV strategy.
Source: Authors.
Outcome β s.e. P-val A-R test P-val F-Stat P-val
Growth of cereal
production
value
1.24 0.14 0.000 *** 80.65 0.000 8.91 0.000
Net value of cereal
production
0.90 0.14 0.000 *** 39.75 0.000 6.88 0.000
Share of production
sold through
coops
0.18 0.02 0.000 *** 75.7 0.000 4.63 0.000
*= 10% confidence level; **= 5% confidence level; ***=1% confidence
level.
28 The complete tables of the standard IV estimates can be viewed in the Appendix. All
the impact coefficients are significant at the 1% level. 29 We used the Stata (13) user-written command nplate developed by Frölich (2007).
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to a less restrictive specification of the exclusion restriction assumption.
5.1. Heterogeneity analysis
In order to obtain a better understanding of the effectiveness of a
project like the AVCPO, it is necessary to examine whether some groups
benefit from it more than others. For example, Herrmann (2017) finds
that participation in sugarcane out-grower schemes in Tanzania led to
greater increases in income among land-rich farmers than among land-
poor farmers. By contrast, Rao and Qaim (2011) in Kenya find that
land-poor farmers benefit over-proportionally from participation in
supermarket channels.
This sub-section explores variations of the AVCPO’s impact ac-
cording to three levels of farm size: 0–2 ha, 2–4 ha and more than 4 ha
(see Table 10).30 Farm size is taken as a proxy for the household’s
overall economic status, as well as its productive potential. This het-
erogeneity analysis was conducted using the IV with PSM and LATE
approaches.
As shown in Table 11, the positive and statistically significant effect
of the AVCPO is consistent across the three groups and all selected
outcomes. As shown in Table 12, the project’s impact does not differ
significantly across the categories of farm size.31 Therefore, unlike in
the studies by Herrmann (2017) and Rao and Qaim (2011), we con-
clude that the project benefits land-richer and land-poorer farmers
equally.
5.2. Analysis of the AVCPO’s effects on land-use outcomes
Table 13 shows that substituting cereal crops for other types of
crops is not especially common, while also drawing attention to the fact
that crop rotation practices have largely continued unchanged. How-
ever, participation in the AVCPO has significantly reduced the amount
of land that is used for bread wheat and (to a lesser extent) other cer-
eals. In other words, there seems to be a partial crowding-out of bread
wheat, the most common cash crop in the area. Grazing, horticulture,
and fallow areas were not affected.32
5.3. Analysis of the AVCPO’s effects on wellbeing outcomes
While the dependent variables analysed so far could have been
directly affected by the project, and in a relatively short time, this is not
the case for other wellbeing outcomes. In particular, an improvement in
diet and education could take longer to materialise. Unfortunately, we
do not have data on intermediate variables, such as household ex-
penditures on health and education.
Table 14 shows that the project has had a positive and significant
Table 9
Non-parametric LATE estimates of the impact of AVCPO.
Source: Authors.
Outcome β s.e. P-val
Growth of cereal production value 1.232779 0.126758 0.000 ***
Net value of cereal production 0.8768 0.125 0.000 ***
Share of production sold through coops 0.176862 0.041762 0.000 ***
*=10% confidence level; **= 5% confidence level; ***= 1% confidence
level.
Table 10
Farm size groups and treatment status.
Source: Authors.
Farm size Total Treated Control
0–2 ha 201 47 154
2–4 ha 282 105 177
4+ha 255 110 145
Table 11
Estimates according to farm size.
Source: Authors.
Outcome Farm size PSM+ IV LATE
β s.e. P-val β s.e. P-val
Growth of
cereal
production
value
(a) 0–2 ha 1.55 0.37 0.000 *** 1.47 0.26 0.000 ***
(b) 2–4 ha 1.19 0.19 0.000 *** 1.16 0.20 0.000 ***
(c) 4+ ha 1.21 0.20 0.000 *** 1.22 0.17 0.000 ***
Net value of
cereal
produc-
tion
(a) 0–2 ha 1.05 0.22 0.000 *** 1.09 0.19 0.000 ***
(b) 2–4 ha 0.82 0.21 0.000 *** 0.67 0.23 0.000 ***
(c) 4+ ha 0.82 0.23 0.000 *** 0.99 0.23 0.000 ***
Share of
production
sold
through
coops
(a) 0–2 ha 0.25 0.07 0.000 *** 0.20 0.08 0.000 ***
(b) 2–4 ha 0.13 0.04 0.000 *** 0.13 0.06 0.000 ***
(c) 4+ ha 0.20 0.03 0.000 *** 0.19 0.05 0.000 ***
*= 10% confidence level; **= 5% confidence level; ***=1% confidence
level.
Table 12
Tests of differences in project’s impact across farm size categories.
Source: Authors.
Outcome difference βi-βj s.e. p-val
Growth of cereal production value group(a) - group
(b)
0.36 0.42 0.398
group(a) - group(c) 0.34 0.42 0.375
group(b) - group(c) -0.02 0.27 0.939
Net value of cereal production group(a) - group
(b)
0.23 0.30 0.469
group(a) - group(c) 0.23 0.32 0.425
group(b) - group(c) 0.00 0.30 0.904
Share of production sold through
coops
group(a) - group
(b)
0.12 0.08 0.179
group(a) - group(c) 0.05 0.08 0.516
group(b) - group(c) -0.07 0.05 0.256
Table 13
PSM+ IV estimates of impact on land-use outcomes.
Source: Authors.
Outcome β s.e. P-val
=1 practice crop rotation −0.03 0.06 0.675
Share of cereals on total agricultural land 0.06 0.04 0.147
Share of bread wheat on total cereal area −0.72 0.17 0.000 ***
Share of other cereals on total cereal area −0.18 0.05 0.000 ***
*= 10% confidence level; **= 5% confidence level; ***=1% confidence
level.
30 The 0–2 ha category was selected because the threshold of 2 ha is adopted by the
FAO and hence often used in the academic literature (e.g. Lowder et al., 2016; Graeub
et al., 2016) and in official documents (e.g. IFAD, 2013; Singh et al., 2002) to identify
smallholders. The remaining two categories were determined in order to have categories
of comparable size.terciles, which led to results that are not significantly different from
the ones presented in Table 9.
31 These tests were performed on the PSM+IV estimates.
32 For this set of outcomes, we also conducted the heterogeneity analysis (see Table A9
in the Appendix). The AVCPO's impacts on the likelihood of practicing crop rotation, the
proportion of bread wheat to total agricultural land and the proportion of other cereals to
total cereal area are independent of farm size. Where a difference does emerge is for the
proportion of cereals to total agricultural land: The project's effects are significantly
stronger for farmers with 0–2 ha and 2–4 ha of land. This is not surprising: Smaller
farmers, who want to start growing durum wheat may need to reduce the quantity of land
intended for both cereals and other crops.
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effect on education, which was measured as the share of family mem-
bers aged 6–18 who were enrolled in school. The effect is stronger and
more significant among girls than among boys.33
Treated households score lower on the household food insecurity
access scale, even though the coefficient is significant only at the 10%
level. Treated households were less likely to eat smaller meals than
households in the control group (the coefficient is significant at 5%).
They also make less use of the coping strategy “eating fewer meals”
than control households; the difference, however, is not statistically
significant. Lastly, the effect of the project on dietary diversity is also
not statistically significant. The same trend emerges when considering
consumption of all the major food groups: protein-rich food items, ve-
getables, milk and milk derivatives as well as fruit.34
6. Concluding remarks and policy implications
Economic, demographic, and urbanisation trends in many low-in-
come countries are often associated with both increases and shifts in
food demand patterns. In some cases, changes in food demand are met
by increases in imports. For instance, the growing demand for pasta in
Ethiopia is largely met by increasing imports of both durum wheat and
pasta products. Durum wheat has been produced in Ethiopia for cen-
turies. The country is a leading wheat producer in SSA, and is the only
country where smallholders have a majority share in wheat production
(Shiferaw et al., 2014; Minot et al., 2015). Smallholders, however, face
bottlenecks and other difficulties in satisfying the growing internal
demands of the pasta industry (Gebreselassie et al., 2017). Enhancing
both food security and promoting inclusive, agriculture-led in-
dustrialisation is at the heart of Ethiopia’s development strategy.
This paper examined a multi-stakeholder VC development project
called AVCPO. This project constituted the largest durum wheat VC
project in the region, and was implemented by a wide range of public
and private sector stakeholders supported by the Italian Development
Cooperation. The project aimed at increasing the quantity and quality
of durum wheat production, and connecting smallholder farmers to the
national pasta industry via cooperatives and contract farming. Although
official documents point to a large increase in durum wheat cultivation
in the Bale highlands during the project’s duration, there is a need for
empirical evidence on the project’s impact on smallholder agricultural
performance and wellbeing.
Based on a large household survey, this paper investigated the ef-
fects of the AVCPO on cereals production in combination with the share
of production that ended up being sold through cooperatives. It also
sought to study the effects on other wellbeing outcomes, namely edu-
cation and food security. Furthermore, it investigated the project’s
impact on land use practices and whether it crowded out other food
crops. We employed an IV approach and three additional estimation
strategies to account for potential violations of the exclusion restriction
assumption. Given that our estimates build on cross-sectional data and
retrospective information, some caution is required in establishing firm
causal relationships.
Regardless of the method employed, our findings suggest that the
AVCPO has had a positive impact on gross and net values of cereal
production per hectare. Moreover, our findings point to a positive effect
on the share of production sold by farmers to pasta makers through
cooperatives. The heterogeneity analysis suggests that the AVCPO’s
effects were positive for different categories of farm size, and that land-
rich and land-poor farmers benefited equally from the project’s activ-
ities.
Interestingly, the changes brought about by the AVCPO do not seem
to have occurred at the expense of crop rotation practices that preserve
soil fertility. In fact, the expansion of cultivable land for growing durum
wheat came mostly at the expense of bread wheat. Other estimates
highlight the positive contribution the AVCPO has made to educational
outcomes and food security. However, no significant effect has been
detected in terms of household diet.
While an evaluation of the longer-term effects would be necessary to
understand the sustainability of the AVCPO, the findings of this study
already point to its effectiveness and to the potential of such a project to
improve agricultural VCs and farmers’ living standards. However, two
issues should be analysed further before replicating or scaling up an
intervention like this. First, while the results seem to suggest that
AVCPO does not benefit land-rich farmers to a proportionally higher
degree, the issue of participation in the project remains. Our analysis
shows that ownership of land and assets is important in explaining who
participates in the project. While this point requires further investiga-
tion, we think that large economies of scale are not necessarily required
to benefit from this type of project. Our hypothesis is that the innova-
tions introduced by the AVCPO could have particularly attracted less
risk-averse and wealthier farmers, who therefore decided to join the
project at an early stage. This idea is supported by the fact that younger
farmers, who are usually less risk-averse than older farmers, were more
likely to sign up. After learning about the widespread positive effects of
the project, other farmers may decide to participate. However, more
research is required to validate this point.
Second, when attempting to adapt a project like the AVCPO, policy-
makers should be aware that the Bale Zone features larger than average
size farms and is characterised by agro-ecological conditions that are
favourable for growing wheat. Moreover, the infrastructure projects
undertaken in Bale improved market accessibility and created a
window of opportunity for local producers.
In other words, the growing demand for pasta might offer greater
opportunities for small-scale Ethiopian wheat farmers, but increasing
the quality and quantity of their harvests and connecting them to the
national pasta industry poses a significant policy challenge.
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